Upgrading
What the version number tells you
BKE versions are classified by what the upgrade does to a running cluster, not by which piece of software moved. So you can decide whether an upgrade needs a maintenance window from the number alone, without reading a changelog.
| Digit that moved | What you may conclude |
|---|---|
| third (patch) | component pods rolled. No drain. Your manifests are unaffected |
| second (minor) | a drain and a maintenance window are possible. Your manifests are unaffected, except for the resources of a component whose major version moved, which the release notes name |
| first (major) | schedule it. Your manifests may break. One Kubernetes minor at a time |
In detail:
| Tier | What may move | Effect |
|---|---|---|
| major | the Kubernetes minor | API removals are possible, so your manifests can break. Nodes drain |
| minor | the Kubernetes patch, Calico, containerd, component minors and component majors | Nodes may drain, the dataplane may restart. No API removals |
| patch | component patches, k9s | Workload pods roll. No control-plane change, no drain |
A Kubernetes patch is a BKE minor, not a BKE patch, and the naming is the
weaker argument here. A component patch is a helm upgrade where that
component’s pods roll. A Kubernetes patch is a kubeadm upgrade where the API
server and kubelet restart and each node drains in turn. If both were patches,
then “patch” would sometimes mean a few pods and sometimes mean a maintenance
window — and anyone running an auto-apply-patches policy would receive an
unscheduled drain. Calling it a minor fails safe, because the worst case you must
already assume for a minor includes a window.
The same holds for urgency: a Kubernetes CVE fix ships as a minor. How urgent a change is does not alter what it does to your cluster.
The most invasive change in a release decides its tier. A release carrying a Kubernetes patch and a Longhorn patch is a minor, and the Longhorn patch travels inside it. That is what makes bundling possible, so several changes can go out in one window instead of each claiming its own.
containerd is upgraded only as part of the node upgrade, which runs on a drained node, so a containerd change is always a minor.
A component’s major version is a BKE minor, not a BKE major. The BKE major is reserved for the Kubernetes minor. A component major can still change how that component treats your own resources, so the release notes of a minor that carries one name the component and list those changes.
You can skip patches. You cannot skip minors.
A BKE patch release can be skipped. A BKE minor release cannot. Upgrade to every minor in turn. Within a minor, go straight to its latest patch: there is no need to apply the patches before it.
| From | To | |
|---|---|---|
| 2.0.1 | 2.0.4 | Allowed. Patches may be skipped |
| 2.0.1 | 2.1.3 | Allowed. One minor forward, to any of its patches |
| 2.0.1 | 2.2.0 | Refused. It skips 2.1. Upgrade to the latest 2.1 first |
A new major starts from the last minor of the major before it, and arrives at its first minor. To reach 3.0, a cluster must be on the last 2.x minor. Moving to 3.1 directly from 2.x is refused, because it skips 3.0.
check.sh --version <target> --mode upgrade fails on a move that skips a
minor, and names the version to upgrade to first. It reads the cluster’s current
BKE version from its own record, so run it on a control-plane node. A cluster
with no record yet cannot be assessed, and check.sh warns that it was not,
rather than passing. Run it days before the window rather than at the start of
it.
You also cannot skip a Kubernetes minor, which is why each BKE major moves
Kubernetes by exactly one minor. check.sh fails on that too, and names the two
versions. kubeadm refuses as well, but it refuses once the upgrade is already
under way.
From 2.2.x to 2.3.0
Upgrade from any 2.2 patch; the latest is not required.
Secret encryption is not turned on by the upgrade. A cluster created before
2.3.0 keeps storing its Secrets unencrypted until you turn encryption on with
upgrade.sh --enable-secret-encryption. Do that after the upgrade is complete,
not in the same window as a step of it: both restart the API server, and one
change at a time leaves one candidate if a control plane does not come back.
Encryption at rest gives the procedure.
The compliance controls arrive with the upgrade. Unless config.yaml turns
them off, the upgrade gives your cluster API audit logging, Pod Security
defaults, the control-plane and kubelet hardening settings, the restriction of
anonymous requests to /livez, /readyz and /healthz, and Kuma’s CNI plugin.
Read Compliance and hardening before the window, and decide each one in
config.yaml before step 2. Three of them can change what you see:
- Pod Security refuses nothing new on an upgraded cluster. It enforces
privilegedand warns atrestricted, so akubectl applythat worked before still works and may now print warnings. - A request without a credential reaches only the three health paths. A
monitoring probe or a load balancer that calls
/versionor any other path anonymously is refused with 401 from the upgrade onwards. Point it at/readyz, give it a credential, or setanonymousAccess.restricted: false. - The audit log uses up to about 1.1 GB on each control-plane node at the
default rotation. Confirm the space under
/var/logbefore the window.
The host firewall and the NodePort filter do not arrive with the upgrade; each
stays off until config.yaml turns it on.
Since 2026-11-07, upgrade.sh keeps the Pod Security levels a cluster
enforces, at every BKE version. It sends the cluster’s own admission
configuration, and its plan names any level that would change. Setting
compliance.podSecurity.enforce is no longer needed for that purpose.
Before that date, upgrade.sh --role first gave an existing cluster
privileged unless config.yaml named a level, so a cluster created with 2.3.0
that ran it was lowered from baseline to privileged. To check, run
grep -E '^ *enforce:' /etc/kubernetes/bke/admission-config.yaml on a
control-plane node. To restore baseline, set
compliance.podSecurity.enforce: baseline in config.yaml, run
upgrade.sh --role first --version 2.3.0 on the first control-plane node, then
upgrade.sh --role other --version 2.3.0 on each other control-plane node, each
without and then with --commit. Once the cluster enforces baseline again,
the setting may be removed; upgrade.sh then keeps baseline.
The other control-plane nodes take their files from the cluster. The first
control-plane node’s upgrade writes the audit policy and the Pod Security
configuration to /etc/kubernetes/bke, and stores that directory in the
cluster, encrypted under keys derived from the cluster CA’s private key. Each
other control-plane node’s upgrade.sh --role other takes it from there before
its API server is upgraded. Without --commit it lists what it would take and
writes nothing. Nothing is copied by hand, and workers need nothing.
If your cluster’s CA private key is not on its nodes, copy the directory from the first node to each other control-plane node before its run instead:
tar -C /etc/kubernetes -cpf - bke | ssh root@<node> tar -C /etc/kubernetes -xpf -
Adding a node changes at 2.3.0. A node is added with upgrade.sh
--add-node on a control-plane node, which prints the command that installs and
joins the new one. Adding nodes describes it.
The Release notes list everything else that changes, including the changes that can affect your own resources.
Plan before the window
curl -sL https://bke.maml.uk/upgrade.sh | sh -s -- \
--role first --version 2.3.0
Nothing is upgraded without --commit. Every BKE script works this way: the
default reports, and --commit acts.
Run this days before the maintenance window, not at the start of it. It runs the same preflight the real upgrade runs and then stops. A preflight failure found in preparation costs nothing; the same failure found mid-window costs a stalled cluster.
Like apply.sh, this changes nothing on the node. It downloads the target
kubeadm into a temporary directory and runs the upgrade plan with it, fetches
the container runtime package the upgrade would install, and compares the
containerd configuration. It then lists what --commit will change on that
node: the apt repository, kubeadm, the container runtime, and, where the node’s
/etc/containerd/config.toml differs from the target version’s, that file, with the
number of lines that differ. It is safe to run on a node that is carrying
traffic.
With --commit, the containerd configuration and the runtime package change in
one step, so containerd restarts once; running containers keep running while it
does.
Run check.sh --version <target> --mode upgrade on every node at the same time.
--mode upgrade makes the cluster checks required rather than skipped, which is
what a release test should do.
Read the report before the window, too
curl -sL https://bke.maml.uk/apply.sh | sh -s -- --version 2.3.0
Without --commit this changes nothing, and it answers the questions the window
is being booked for:
- which versions move, including the ones that do not — “netdata is not moving” is worth knowing;
- whether any node drains, and how many;
- whether it can be rolled back — charts can, a Kubernetes upgrade cannot;
- what changes in each of your values files, and where an edit of yours and one of ours have landed on the same setting;
- which Kubernetes objects actually move as a result;
- which values your file holds back — a setting your file keeps at the old chart’s default, and a setting BKE makes that your file leaves out;
- whether the new software accepts its configuration, checked on the node before anything is applied.
Three findings stop an upgrade, and all three are far better found now than in the window: a values conflict, values the new chart will not accept, and a pre-flight check the new software fails (both below). See Installing components for what the four values outcomes mean.
What the objects section is for
A values diff tells you what the file says. It does not tell you what the cluster does about it, and the two come apart in both directions:
kong 4 changed, 1 added, 1 removed, of 13 objects
kuma values changed, NO objects change (of 26)
The second line is the more important of the two. Helm never warns about a values key no template consumes — it is not an error, it is just nothing — so a careful-looking edit can reach nothing at all. The first line is the other half: a one-word change that rewrites six objects.
Both are produced by rendering your values against the pinned chart on each side and comparing the results. Object names and counts only, never bodies, so this section stays safe to paste into a ticket: a rendered manifest contains the values Helm is about to put in a Secret, and some charts generate their own certificates.
A component that could not be rendered says so, by name and with the reason. That line is not a failure of the upgrade, and it does not stop the run, but it does mean you have no answer for that component rather than a reassuring one.
Values your file holds back
Two things can keep a setting where it is without any line of your file changing, so neither values diff can show them. The report lists both, for every field alike, and neither stops the run.
A value at the old chart’s default. If your file sets a value to exactly what the old chart used by default, and the new chart’s default is different, your file keeps the old value and the setting does not move. A file written from a running installation usually carries every image tag this way:
longhorn
image.longhorn.manager.tag
your file v1.0.0 (the old default), new default v1.1.0
The chart is upgraded and the software is not. To take the new default, remove the line from your file. To keep the old value, leave it.
A BKE setting your file leaves out. BKE’s values set some settings for every cluster. If your file does not contain one, the chart’s own default applies instead, and the report says what that is. If you removed it on purpose, nothing needs doing; to restore it, add the line back with the value shown.
Values the new chart will not accept
Most charts publish a schema for their values, and Helm checks your file against
it before it changes anything. A new chart version can remove a key that the
previous one accepted. If your file still sets that key, the report marks the
component REFUSED, lists each key under Values the new chart refuses, and
stops: apply.sh applies components one at a time, so --commit would
upgrade the components before that one and then fail, leaving the cluster
part-upgraded.
cert-manager, against chart v1.21.2
- at '/prometheus/servicemonitor': additional properties 'path',
'targetPort' not allowed
Each path is a key in /etc/bke/values/<component>.yaml. Additional
properties not allowed means the chart no longer has that key. Check whether
the setting still does anything on your cluster, remove or correct each key
named, and run the report again. A file that was taken over from a cluster BKE
did not install often carries a full copy of an earlier chart’s defaults, and
those copies are the usual source.
The section also states what it cannot see, and those limits are real: CRDs the chart installs once and never updates, objects a chart renders only when some other API is already present, and anything decided at apply time rather than at render time.
Components whose files change nothing are summarised in one line each rather
than printed in full — six lines saying unchanged are what make the seventh
readable. Add --show-unchanged if you want all of them. It changes the report
only; the same upgrade happens either way, which is why it is safe to put in a
runbook.
Pre-flight checks: what the new software will not accept
A new version of a component can refuse a configuration that the old version
accepted. The values are then the same before and after, so no diff shows
anything, and a chart’s schema has no view of a free-text configuration file.
The only reliable answer comes from the new software itself. So before the
report is printed, apply.sh checks every component that the run changes, on
the node it runs on:
- Every image exists. Only the image’s manifest is fetched, a few kilobytes, so a missing tag is found without downloading anything large. An image that is pulled from outside the BKE mirror is listed as a warning.
- The API server accepts every object, in a server-side dry run with strict field validation. Nothing is stored.
- The software accepts its own configuration, where it can say so. Each
check runs the component’s new image against the configuration it would be
given, in a container that has no network and only the files the check
provides. A ConfigMap or Secret of your own that the pod mounts, such as a
Kong plugin listed in
plugins.configMaps, is read from your cluster on the node and given to the check as the pod receives it; it does not leave the node:
| Component | The check |
|---|---|
| Fluent Bit | its own configuration test, --dry-run |
| Kong | kong check, kong prepare (which runs nginx -t), then a start and stop |
| Kong ingress controller, cert-manager, metrics-server, Kuma | start-up against an API server that does not answer: a refused configuration exits before it ever tries to connect |
| Netdata | start-up, then its effective configuration is read back; any option it ignores is a warning, because Netdata never refuses a configuration |
| Longhorn | none beyond the two checks above; Longhorn’s own pre-flight covers what can be known in advance |
A check that fails prints the software’s own error lines under it, and the report stops:
fluent-bit
FAILED Fluent Bit configuration test (--dry-run) (exit 1)
[error] [parser] parser named 'apache' already exists, skip.
[error] [config] could not configure service property
'parsers_file'
[error] configuration file contains errors, aborting.
Correct /etc/bke/values/<component>.yaml and run the report again. In this
example the file defines a parser that the new Fluent Bit image already ships
under the same name. The older version logged the duplicate and continued; the
newer one stops. Removing the duplicate definitions from config.customParsers
is the correction.
A check reproduces the pod outside the cluster, and a reproduction can be wrong where the software is not. If you are certain that a failed check is wrong, accept it by name, and the run proceeds with the failure still printed:
BKE_ACCEPT_VALUES_RISK="preflight" \
sh -c 'curl -sL https://bke.maml.uk/apply.sh | sh -s -- --version 2.3.0 --commit'
A check that cannot be run never stops the run. No ctr on the node, a
registry that asks for credentials, an image that will not download: each is
reported as not run, with the reason, and the upgrade proceeds exactly as it
would have without the checks.
What the checks cost. Each image under test is downloaded once into a
separate containerd namespace, bke-preflight, and removed when the checks
finish, together with the namespace. Where every component changes, as in a
minor upgrade, that is several hundred megabytes on the node where apply.sh
runs, and a few minutes. A component that does not change is not checked: the
software running it has already accepted its configuration.
What the checks cannot see. A configuration test checks that a configuration is valid; it does not connect to a log destination or a database, so a wrong host name still passes. An option the software silently ignores passes too, except in Netdata, which reports it. The dry run does not check NodePort ranges, and it skips a namespace that the apply has yet to create.
What leaves the node. The checks are prepared by the BKE API from the same values the report is built from, and their results are sent back to it so that the report can include them: each check’s exit status and the last part of its output. Nothing is stored.
The sequence
apply.sh --commitat the current version, to confirm the cluster is reconciled and nothing has drifted.upgrade.sh --role first --commiton one control-plane node. This moves the control plane. If that node runs workloads (it has no control-plane taint), drain it first and uncordon it afterwards, as in step 3.- On every remaining node — control-plane and worker alike — one at a time:
drain it, run
upgrade.sh --role other --commiton it, uncordon it, and wait until it isReadyand every Longhorn volume ishealthybefore the next node. apply.sh --version <new>, then--commit, to bring the components to the new graph.
upgrade.sh does not drain the node it runs on. The drain and the uncordon
are yours, so that you decide when a node’s workloads move.
# step 2, on one control-plane node
curl -sL https://bke.maml.uk/upgrade.sh | sh -s -- --role first --version 2.3.0 --commit
# step 3, for each remaining node: from a control-plane node
kubectl drain <node> --ignore-daemonsets --delete-emptydir-data --timeout=15m
# then on that node
curl -sL https://bke.maml.uk/upgrade.sh | sh -s -- --role other --version 2.3.0 --commit
# then from a control-plane node
kubectl uncordon <node>
kubectl get volumes.longhorn.io -n longhorn-system \
-o custom-columns=NAME:.metadata.name,ROBUSTNESS:.status.robustness
# step 4, once, from a control-plane node - read it, then commit it
curl -sL https://bke.maml.uk/apply.sh | sh -s -- --version 2.3.0
curl -sL https://bke.maml.uk/apply.sh | sh -s -- --version 2.3.0 --commit
Step 1 also sets where the control plane is pulled from. kubeadm upgrade
pulls the control-plane images, kube-proxy and CoreDNS from the registry recorded
in the kubeadm-config ConfigMap in kube-system. A cluster created before BKE
pinned that registry, or created by another installer, records the upstream
registry there. apply.sh shows the one-line change that corrects it, and
--commit stores it. Storing it restarts nothing; the registry takes effect at
step 2. If your cluster runs a different Kubernetes patch from the one this BKE
version pins, apply.sh says so and makes the change at the first apply after an
upgrade instead.
--role first and --role other describe order, not importance. The first
node is whichever control-plane node you choose to go first; every other node,
including other control-plane nodes, is other.
During
You drain the nodes in turn. Workloads without a PodDisruptionBudget and without enough replicas will be unavailable while their node is drained — that is ordinary Kubernetes behaviour, and the upgrade is when you find out whether your budgets are right.
What to expect in an upgrade that drains nodes:
- In a release that moves Calico, Calico restarts on every node while
upgrade.shruns on the first control-plane node, before any other node is drained. Pod traffic pauses briefly on each node, and writes to a Longhorn volume can pause for around 20 seconds and then resume without error. - A Longhorn volume that moves with a drained node pauses for as long as it takes to detach and attach again on another node, typically under a minute.
- Kong answers only on nodes running a Kong pod, because its proxy Service
keeps the client’s address (
externalTrafficPolicy: Local). A drained node stops answering on ports 32080 and 32443, and Kubernetes does not move pods back after an uncordon. A load balancer that health-checks the NodePort sends traffic only to nodes that answer, and with Kong’s two replicas on different nodes, one node answers throughout.
upgrade.sh collects warnings as it goes and prints them at the end rather than
burying them in the middle of the output. Read that block; it is where anything
that succeeded-but-not-cleanly ends up.
--ignore-preflight-errors
upgrade.sh passes this through to kubeadm, and every check you ignore is
logged by name. Use it when you know why a check is failing and have decided it
is acceptable — not to make an unexplained failure go away.
The one case a customised CoreDNS meets: a Corefile carrying an import line
fails the preflight with CoreDNSUnsupportedPlugins on an upgrade that moves
CoreDNS to a new version, because kubeadm cannot migrate a Corefile that has
one. An upgrade that leaves CoreDNS where it is does not inspect the Corefile,
and passes without the flag. check.sh compares the CoreDNS running on your
cluster with the version the upgrade installs, warns days ahead when it moves,
and prints the exact flag to bring:
--ignore-preflight-errors=CoreDNSUnsupportedPlugins
Do not delete the import to satisfy the preflight. The configuration it pulls in is live, and its loss is silent — nothing fails when it disappears, DNS answers simply change.
--kernel-modules
A node installed by BKE has dm_crypt loaded and persisted for every boot —
Longhorn’s encrypted volumes need it, and without it an encrypted volume fails
at attach time, a long way from the cause. A node that came to BKE some other
way may not, and an upgrade does not change how your node boots unless you ask
it to.
--kernel-modules asks: the upgrade then loads the module immediately and
writes /etc/modules-load.d/bke.conf so it survives a reboot, the same as an
installed node. Run it once per node, on the same upgrade run you are already
doing; it is idempotent, and it does nothing on a run without --commit. If you do not
use encrypted StorageClasses, you do not need it.
Afterwards
curl -sL https://bke.maml.uk/version.sh | sh
kubectl get nodes
version.sh reports what a node is running and changes nothing. Every node
should report the new BKE version, and kubectl get nodes should show the new
Kubernetes version on all of them. A node left behind is a node that will drift
further with the next upgrade.
Rolling back
There is no supported downgrade path. Kubernetes does not support downgrading a control plane, and a BKE version that moves backwards is not a route back to where you were.
BKE does not hard-block it, deliberately — a downgrade during recovery has to stay
possible — but it does tell you loudly. check.sh fails on a component that
would move backwards, and explains the specific danger: charts carry their CRDs,
so a chart moving backwards replaces newer CRD schemas with older ones underneath
running workloads, while those workloads keep the newer image, because image tags
are pinned separately.
So the protection is on the other side of the upgrade, not behind it. Before you start:
- take an etcd snapshot —
etcdctl snapshot saveon a control-plane node. On a cluster that encrypts Secrets, the snapshot can be restored only with the key in/etc/kubernetes/bke/encryption-config.yaml, so confirm you hold a copy of it, stored apart from the snapshot; - confirm your Longhorn backups are current, rather than assuming it.
Storage covers how to confirm the second one, and why a backup target that has never worked looks exactly like one that is idle.